This paper is concerned with distributions of income and the ordering of related Lorenz curves. By introducing appropriate preference relations on the set of Lorenz curves, two alternative axiomatic characterizations of Lorenz curve orderings are proposed. Moreover, the Gini coefficient is recognized to be rationalizable under both axiom sets; as a result, a complete axiomatic characterization of the Gini coefficient is obtained. Furthermore, axiomatic characterizations of the extended Gini family and an alternative "generalized" Gini family of inequality measures are proposed.
Introduction
Analyses of income distribution focus both on the level of income and relative income differences, i.e. on the size and the division of the cake. In applied work the standard approach is to separate these two dimensions and use the Lorenz curve as a basis for analysing the relative income differences. By displaying the deviation of each individual income share from the income share that corresponds to perfect equality, the Lorenz curve captures the essential descriptive features of the concept of inequality. The normative aspects of Lorenz curve orderings have been discussed by Kolm (1969 Kolm ( , 1976a Kolm ( , 1976b , Sen (1973) , and Atkinson (1970) who demonstrated that Lorenz curve orderings of distributions with equal means may correspond to social welfare orderings. The assumption of equal means, however, limits the applicability of their results. Real world interventions that alter the income distribution are usually not mean preserving changes; taxes and transfer programs, for example, are interventions that decrease and increase the mean level of income. If, in such situations, concern about inequality is over relative rather than absolute income differences 1 , the condition of scale invariance has to be introduced. The condition of scale invariance implies that inequality is compatible with the representation given by the Lorenz curve. Thus, adopting the Lorenz curve as a basis for judging between income distributions means that we are only concerned about the distributional aspects independent of the level of mean income. This is in line with common practice in applied economics where the Lorenz curve and related summary measures of inequality are used to compare inequality in distributions with different mean incomes 2 . This practice demonstrates that the ordering of Lorenz curves in cases of variable mean income is of interest in its own right, irrespective of how we judge a possible conflict between the level of mean income and the degree of (in)equality and its implications for social welfare.
In theories of social welfare it has long been considered very important to decompose social welfare with respect to mean income and inequality. The standard approach is to derive this decomposition and the related measures of inequality from specified social welfare functions, see e.g. Kolm (1969) , Atkinson (1970) , Sen (1973) , and Blackorby and Donaldson (1978) who also proposed a method for deriving social welfare functions from given measures of inequality. For a critical discussion of the Kolm-Atkinson approach see Sen (1978) , and Ebert (1987) who also introduced an alternative approach by explicitly taking into account value judgments of the trade-off between mean and (in)equality in deriving social welfare functions. As a first step, Ebert (1987) introduced a meanindependent ordering of income distributions in terms of inequality. Then, to deal with the meanequality trade-off an ordering was defined on pairs of mean income and degrees of inequality.
Moreover, the second ordering was required to be consistent with the first ordering in the sense that the distribution with lowest inequality is preferred in comparisons of distributions with equal means. Ebert (1987) demonstrated that by combining these two orderings a social welfare ordering is obtained and furthermore that the related social welfare functions allow a mean-inequality split-up 3 .
Now, referring to the standard practice of separately comparing the means and Lorenz curves of income distributions it appears attractive to represent the distribution by the mean income and the Lorenz curve. Thus, following Ebert's two-step approach, orderings defined on Lorenz curves can be used as a basis for deriving social welfare orderings and related welfare functions. The starting point is to introduce a preference ordering on the set of Lorenz curves as a basis for assessing the degree of inequality. Next, combining this ordering with a second ordering defined on pairs of mean income and degrees of inequality, a social welfare ordering is obtained.
The purpose of this paper is to provide an axiomatic basis for Lorenz curve orderings.
Judgments concerning trade-off between mean and (in)equality are, however, beyond the scope of the paper. Section 2 presents two alternative sets of assumptions concerning a person's preferences over Lorenz curves and gives convenient representations of the corresponding preference relations.
Furthermore, complete axiomatizations of the Gini coefficient, the extended Gini family and a new "generalized" Gini family of inequality measures are proposed. Section 3 introduces an alternative characterization of first-degree Lorenz dominance as a criterion for inequality aversion to those provided by Atkinson (1970) and Yaari (1988) .
Representation results
In this section we shall demonstrate that the problem of ranking Lorenz curves can, formally, be viewed as analogous to the problem of choice under uncertainty. In theories of choice under uncertainty, preference orderings over probability distributions are introduced as basis for deriving utility indexes. In the present context the corresponding point of departure is to assume appropriate preference relations on the set of Lorenz curves.
The Lorenz curve L for a cumulative income distribution F with mean μ is defined by represented by a preference relation  , which will be assumed to satisfy the following basic axioms, Axiom 1 (Order).  is a transitive and complete ordering on L.
Then it follows by Debreu (1964) 
Axioms 4 and 5 correspond to the independence axioms of the expected utility theory and
Yaari's dual theory of choice under uncertainty, respectively (see Yaari (1987) ) and require that the ordering is invariant with respect to certain changes in the Lorenz curves being compared. If L 1 is weakly preferred to L 2 , then Axiom 4 states that any mixture on L 1 is weakly preferred to the corresponding mixture on L 2 . The intuition is that identical mixing interventions on the Lorenz curves being compared do not affect the ranking of Lorenz curves; the ranking depends solely on how the differences between the mixed Lorenz curves are judged.
In order to clarify the interpretation of Axiom 4, consider an example with a tax/transfer intervention that alters the shape of the income distributions and leaves the mean incomes unchanged:
Let F 1 and F 2 be income distributions with means μ 1 and μ 2 and Lorenz curves L 1 and L 2 . Now suppose that these distributions are affected by the following tax/transfer reform. First, a proportional tax with tax rate 1-α is introduced. Second, the collected taxes are in both cases redistributed according to appropriate scale transformations of some distribution function F 3 with mean μ 3 . This means that the two sets of collected taxes are redistributed according to the same Lorenz curve. It is understood that this redistribution is carried out so as to give equal-sized transfers or transfers that are less progressive than a set of equal-sized transfers. Specifically, this means that ( )( )
is the transfer received by the t-quantile unit of the income distribution F i . At the extreme, when F 3 is a degenerate distribution function, the transfers are equal to the average tax (1-α)μ i . At the other extreme F 3 will give all the collected tax to the best well-off unit. After this tax/transfer intervention, the inverses of the two income distributions are given by
where is the left inverse of F i . Now, it follows readily from (2) that this intervention leaves the mean incomes, μ 1 and μ 2 , unchanged. Moreover, (2) implies that the Lorenz curve for F i after the intervention have changed from L i to
Hence, if L 1 is weakly preferred to L 2 , then Axiom 4 states that the changes in L 1 and L 2 that follows from the above intervention will not affect the ranking of Lorenz curves.
Axiom 5 postulates a similar invariance property on the inverse Lorenz curves to that postulated by Axiom 4 on the Lorenz curves. The essential difference between the two axioms is that Axiom 5 deals with the relationship between given income shares and weighted averages of corresponding population shares, while Axiom 4 deals with the relationship between given population shares and weighted averages of corresponding income shares. Thus, Axiom 5 requires the ordering relation  to be invariant with respect to aggregation of sub-populations across cumulative income shares. That is, if for a specific population the Lorenz curve L 1 is weakly preferred to the Lorenz curve L 2 , then mixing this population with any other population with respect to the distributions of their income shares does not affect the ranking of Lorenz curves. As an illustration, consider a population divided into a group of poor and a group of rich where each unit's income is equal to the corresponding group mean. In judging between two-points distributions a person who approves Axiom 4 and disapproves Axiom 5 will be more concerned about the number of poor rather than about how poor they are. By contrast, a person who approves Axiom 5 and disapproves Axiom 4 will emphasize the size of the poor's income share rather than how many they are.
By restricting to distributions with equal means we see that Axiom 4 can be interpreted as a weaker version of Yaari's dual independence axiom. This means that a person who approves Yaari's dual independence axiom will always approve Axiom 4. Thus, the result in Theorem 1 can be considered as an alternative (and slightly different) version of the representation result of Yaari (1987 Yaari ( , 1988 
Moreover, p is unique up to a positive affine transformation. (4) is true for all Then by noting that
Proof. Assume that there exists a continuous and non-increasing real function p(⋅) such that
it follows by straightforward verification that  satisfies Axioms 1-4.
To prove sufficiency, note that L is a subfamily of distribution functions. Furthermore, it follows from Axioms 1-4 that the conditions of Theorem 3 of Fishburn (1982) are satisfied and thus that there exists a continuous function p(⋅) satisfying (4) where p(⋅) is unique up to a positive affine transformation. It follows from the monotonicity property of Axiom 2 that p(⋅) is nonincreasing.
Q.E.D.
where P' is the derivative of P, which is a continuously differentiable and concave distribution function defined on the unit interval. Theorem 1 demonstrates that a person who supports Axioms 1-4 will rank Lorenz curves according to the criterion V P . For convenience, and with no loss of generality, we assume . This is a normalization condition which ensures that V P has the unit interval as ′ = P ( ) 1 0 its range, taking the maximum value 1 if incomes are equally distributed and the minimum value 0 if one unit holds all income. Thus, J P defined by
measures the extent of inequality in an income distribution with Lorenz curve L, when P is the chosen preference or weight function 4 . By choosing P t it follows directly from (6) and Theorem 1 that the Gini coefficient is rationalizable under Axioms 1-4. Note that μV P corresponds to the utility representation of the "dual theory" of choice under risk proposed by Yaari (1987 Yaari ( , 1988 who also demonstrated that the absolute Gini difference was rationalizable under the "dual theory". Moreover,
by choosing appropriate preference functions we can derive attractive alternatives to the Gini coefficient which are consistent with Theorem 1. For example, by choosing the following family of P-
( )
we obtain the following family of measures of inequality
The family { } k G is the extended Gini family of inequality measures, introduced by Donaldson and Weymark (1980) and by Kakwani (1980) as an extension of a poverty measure proposed by Sen (1976) . For a discussion of the extended Gini family, we refer to Weymark (1980, 1983) and Yitzhaki (1983) . By exploiting the fact that the Lorenz curve can be considered analogous to a cumulative distribution function Aaberge (2000) demonstrated that the subfamily of the extended Gini family formed by the integer values of k in (8) we obtain the following related family of inequality measures
G is the Gini coefficient.
As mentioned above L -1 can be considered as a distribution function. Thus, the inverse Lorenz curve is uniquely determined by its moments, which means that the Lorenz curve can be recovered and (20) [ ]
Now, inserting (19) and (20) in (18) we obtain the following equation
Note that (21) is equivalent to the functional equation (22) [ ]
x y for all x y = ∈ 0 1 which has the following solution (see e.g. Aczel, 1966), or 1, or there exists such that
Inserting (23) into (19) and (20), respectively, the results of Theorems 3 and 4 are obtained.
In addition to providing a rationale for the extended Gini family G and the alternative "generalized" Gini family G * of measures of inequality, Theorems 3 and 4 demonstrate that G and G * are ordinally equivalent on L .
Although several authors have discussed rationales for the absolute Gini difference (see Sen (1974) , Hey and Lambert (1980) , Weymark (1981) Donaldson and Weymark (1983) and Yaari (1987 Yaari ( , 1988 ), for the Gini coefficient (Thon (1982) ) and for the absolute Gini differences as well as for the Gini coefficient (Ben Porath and Gilboa (1992)), no one has established a rationale for the Gini coefficient as a preference ordering on Lorenz curves. Moreover, a complete axiomatic characterization of the absolute Gini difference and/or the Gini coefficient has neither been provided.
However, as was demonstrated above, the Gini coefficient is rationalizable under Axioms 1-4 as well as under Axioms 1-3 and 5. Thus, we may conjecture that the Gini coefficient represents the preference relation which satisfy Axioms 1-5. 
where equation (24) is established by inserting (16) in (17) and Ψ is given by (23). Now, as (24) has to hold for all we obtain the following equation by inserting L u in (24), L ∈L u ( ) =
By applying Lemma 1 in Appendix, it follows that equation (25) 
Inequality aversion
In expected utility theory it is standard to impose restrictions on the utility function applying various types of stochastic dominance rules. For example, "risk aversion" is equivalent to second-degree stochastic dominance and imposes strict concavity on the utility function. Analogous to the standard theory of choice under uncertainty Atkinson (1970) defined inequality aversion as being equivalent to risk aversion. This was motivated by the fact that the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle is identical to the principle of mean preserving spread introduced by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) which is equivalent to the condition of dominating non-intersecting Lorenz curves when we restrict attention to distributions with equal means. These principles may even be used as basis for discussing and 
Theorem 6 demonstrates that first-degree Lorenz dominance and thereby inequality aversion is characterized by the strict convexity of Q-functions. Alternatively, it can be characterized by the strict concavity of P-functions. Based on these results one might expect that a "more concave" P-function or a "more convex" Q-function would exhibit more inequality aversion. As was recognized by Yaari (1988) and easily can be verified from (6) displays more inequality aversion than if P 1 lies J P 1 J P 2 above P 2 and P 1 and P 2 are concave. Similarly, it follows from (13) 
are continuous on P t and P t for t and P :
, ,
An interesting question is whether the characterization of Lorenz dominance can be achieved for smaller classes of preference functions than P 1 and Q 1 . As referred to above Aaberge (2000) demonstrated that the subfamily { } (u) [ ] ∈ u 0,1 and the inequality holds strictly for at least one ∈ u 0,1
Note that the most inequality averse J P -measure is obtained as the preference function
As P a is not differentiable, it is not a member of the family P 1 of inequality averse preference functions, but it is recognizable as the upper limit of inequality aversion for members of P 1 .
Inserting (26) in (6) , and using integration by parts it follows that The converse statement follows by straightforward application of Lemma 2.
